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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
RANDALL EDWARD KOTZ, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 860269-CA 
Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of Case and Statement of Facts are set forth 
previously in Appellant's Brief at 1-3. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A failure to review this issue would result in manifest 
injustice. While defense counsel did not object on the record, she 
registered her objection to the instruction in chambers. 
Defense counsel did not waive the requirement that she be 
provided with a written copy of the instruction the court intended 
to give. The facts show no waiver and waiver cannot be presumed 
from a silent record. Nor did defense counsel stipulate to the 
instruction; a stipulation requires a written agreement or an oral 
statement on the record, neither of which occurred in this case. 
The Court should reject the use of supplemental 
instructions since the use of such instructions violates due process 
and the right to fair trial by an impartial jury under both the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. Utah has never approved the use of 
such instructions. While the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
cautiously approved the use of such instructions, it has suggested 
that they be given only in the original set of instructions and not 
after the jury has begun deliberations. In addition, the 
instruction itself was coercive. 
Finally, this Court is in a position to proscribe the use 
of supplemental instructions. The abridgement of rights under the 
Utah Constitution was implicit in Mr. Kotz's argument in the opening 
brief. In addition the Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah case 
law allow review of this issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A FAILURE TO REVIEW THIS ISSUE WOULD RESULT IN 
MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
A. DEFENSE COUNSEL REGISTERED HER OBJECTIONS IN 
CHAMBERS. 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IA AT 6) 
A realistic approach to reviewing errors at trial requires 
a recognition that in the midst of numerous concerns during a trial, 
an attorney will occasionally forget to place on the record an 
objection made in chambers. The ability of this Court to review an 
error so as to avoid manifest injustice arises out of a recognition 
that trial lawyers, focusing on a myriad of issues and concerns, are 
not always perfect in repeating arguments on the record which have 
already made to the trial court in chambers. 
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In the present case, the record at trial is silent as to 
any discussions regarding the supplemental instruction. However, 
the record from the motion for new trial hearing establishes that an 
in chambers discussion regarding the appropriateness of the 
instruction occurred (R. 82). The recollection of defense counsel 
was that she asked to see a written instruction, and that she had 
some concerns about the propriety of a supplemental instruction and 
needed to do research or call other lawyers in order to backup her 
concerns with case law (R. 82-84, R. 87, 89). 
The prosecutor did not "recall anything I specifically 
disagree with as recited by defense counsel" (R. 86). The court 
stated "Well, my memory is not the best on what took place. I have 
too many of them." (R. 90). The Court did recall a discussion as 
to whether to proceed orally or in writing, and that defense 
counsel, the prosecutor and the Court all had some concerns on this 
point (R. 90). 
The court thought he indicated what he planned to say to 
the jury, but believed he may have summarized rather than given a 
verbatim discussion. (R. 90). The Court's recollection was that 
both counsel were in agreement as to how to proceed, however, the 
recollections of defense counsel and the prosecutor indicated 
otherwise since both acknowledged that defense counsel had some 
concerns about the instructions and made phone calls after the in-
chambers discussion to reach someone familiar with the law regarding 
supplemental instructions. (R. 87,89) 
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In this case, defense counsel voiced her objection in 
chambers and thereafter failed to place the objection on the record, 
but immediately filed a motion for new trial. A failure to review 
the issue, where the jury was pressured into reaching a decision, 
would result in manifest injustice. 
B. THE EXTEMPORANEOUS DELIVERY VIOLATED RULE 19(a) 
SINCE DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE REQUIREMENT FOR WRITTEN 
INSTRUCTION NOR STIPULATE TO ORAL INSTRUCTION. 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT IB AT 7) 
The State acknowledges "(t)he relative advantages of 
instructing the jury from a written text." Respondents Brief at 8. 
However, the State suggests that "it appears that both sides 
stipulated to the supplemental instruction's extemporaneous delivery 
during the discussion in chambers." Respondent's Brief at 8. The 
trial judge acknowledged that he did not have a very good memory of 
the proceedings, but thought both parties had agreed to the 
procedure ultimately followed. He did recall a discussion as to 
whether to proceed orally or in writing (R. 90). 
Defense counsel, however, recalled asking the court about a 
written instruction (R. 86). The prosecutor did not refer to any 
stipulation, but instead stated "that the Court proferred what it 
would be telling the jury, and told defense counsel that if the jury 
still could not reach a decision, she could submit an instruction" 
(R. 57). The recollections taken together, do not suggest that 
counsel waived the right to a written instruction or stipulated to 
such. 
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Waiver of a constitutional right cannot be presumed from a 
silent record. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 8 L.Ed. 2d 70, 82 
S.Ct. 884 (1962). See also State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1986). While the specific right to review a written instruction in 
and of itself is not constitutionally mandated, the resulting 
deprivation of due process, fair trial and trial by an impartial 
jury requires that waiver not be presumed in this case. When the 
resistance to presume waiver is coupled with the factual context as 
clarified at the new trial hearing that defense counsel expressed 
concerns about the instructions and specifically asked about a 
written instruction, waiver cannot be presumed. 
Moreover, a stipulation requires affirmative action from 
both parties, it cannot be presumed from a silent record. Rule 
4.5(b) of the Rules of Practice for District Courts provides that 
stipulations must be in writing or made orally in open court. 
Hence, no waiver of the right to review a written instruction nor 
stipulation that the oral instruction be given to the jury occurred 
in this case. 
C. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE USE OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS. 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT IC1 AT 13) 
The use of supplemental instructions after the jury has 
begun its deliberations violates a defendant's right to trial by an 
impartial jury as guaranteed by Article I, §12 of the Utah 
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Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and to due process and a fair trial as 
guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In 
addition, the use of such instructions abridges the dictates of Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-17(c) (1953 as amended) requiring all felonies 
tried by a jury unless waived and Utah Code Ann. §76-35-17(1) and 
(m) (1953 as amended) which provide for the jury to reach the 
ultimate decision without being interfered with.J-
!• Utah Code Ann. §77-35-17(1) and (m) (1953 as amended) provide: 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the 
jury, they shall be kept together in some 
convenient place under charge of an officer until 
they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by 
order of the court, the officer having them under 
his charge shall not allow any communication to 
be made to them, or make any himself, except to 
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, 
and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, 
communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(m) After the jury has retired for 
deliberation, if they desire to be informed on 
any point of law arising in the cause, they shall 
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall 
communicate such request to the court. The court 
may then direct that the jury be brought before 
the court where, in the presence of the defendant 
and both counsel, the court shall respond to the 
inquiry or advise the jury that no further 
instructions shall be given. Such response shall 
be recorded. The court may in its discretion 
respond to the inquiry in writing without having 
the jury brought before the court, in which case 
the inquiry and the response thereto shall be 
entered in the record. 
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The State argues that no manifest injustice occurred in 
this case since the use of supplemental instructions has been 
approved by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United 
States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896) and by .the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and has "never [been] disapproved or even criticized by a 
Utah appellate court" (Respondent's Brief at 14). While the State 
is correct that Utah has not disapproved the use of supplemental 
instructions, neither has it approved such practice. The only 
comment on the subject in Utah case law is the footnote in State v. 
Medina, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 n.l referred to by both the State 
and Mr. Kotz (Respondent's Brief at 13, 14 and Appellant's Brief at 
4, 12, 14, 15) wherein the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the 
concern which exists over such instructions. 
The State is also correct that the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has "cautiously" approved such instructions. However, that 
court has clarified that the trial judge must exercise caution in 
the use of such instructions so as not to coerce the jury and has 
"call[ed] attention to the inherent danger in this type of 
instruction." United States v. Wynn, 415 F.2d 135, 137 (1965). In 
addition, the Tenth Circuit has "repeatedly suggested that the 
substance of this charge should be included in the original 
instructions," and in United States v. Wynn, supra, "reiterate(d) 
the suggestion that, if it is given at all, it be incorporated in 
the body of the original instructions." The Wynn Court made this 
"suggestion, confident it will be heeded in the conduct of future 
jury trials." Id. 
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In United States v. Blandin, 784 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 
1986), cited by the State in Respondent's Brief at 13,17, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals permitted the use of an Allen instruction 
which was given in the Court's original instructions to the jury. 
In Blandin, the Tenth Circuit again admonished that fl(i)f the Allen 
instruction is given at all, it should be incorporated into the body 
of the court's original instructions to the jury. It should not be 
given during the course of deliberations. United States v. Blandin, 
supra at 1050 (emphasis added). 
Moreover, various other jurisdictions have disapproved the 
use of supplemental instructions. See Brief of Appellant at 4-8; 
See also, An argument for the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in 
California (1975) 15 Santa Clara Law 939. The use of a supplemental 
instruction after the jury has begun deliberations has not been 
approved on appeal in Utah; nor is it acceptable to the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. In light of the coercive nature of such 
instructions and the interference with the jury's deliberations, Mr. 
Kotz respectfully requests that the use not be approved in this 
case. 
D. THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS COERCIVE. 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT IC2 AT 18) 
The State also argues that the instruction itself was not 
coercive. As outlined in Mr. Kotz' opening brief, the judge 
informed the jury that they had enough evidence to reach a decision, 
told them juries make these types of decisions daily, and chastised 
them for avoiding a hard decision (R. 340). Implicit in the judge's 
statements is a demand that the jury reach a verdict and a 
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suggestion that a juror who stuck to his guns and thereby prevented 
the jury from reaching a decision would displease the judge. 
The State contends that the time spent deliberating after 
the instruction was given suggests that the supplemental instruction 
had little impact on the jury. On the contrary, the lengthy 
continued deliberations suggest more strongly that the jury had 
reached an impasse and that a hold out juror ultimately let go of 
his position not because he believed Mr. Kotz was guilty, but 
because the judge coerced the jury into reaching a decision. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT IS IN A POSITION TO PROSCRIBE THE USE OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS AFTER THE JURY HAS BEGUN 
DELIBERATIONS. 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF POINT II AT 21) 
In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the United 
States Supreme Court found that there was no error in the giving of 
a supplemental instruction. In that case, Appellant filed no brief 
and the Court reached its decision without benefit of an analysis by 
Appellant as to why such an instruction would be error. The Allen 
Court did not analyze the giving of the instruction in terms of due 
process or concerns over the right to trial by jury. Nor did it 
analyze the instruction under the rules of criminal procedure; it 
simply stated that no error occurred. 
In asking this Court to disregard Allen, Mr. Kotz outlined 
cases from other jurisdictions where the use of supplemental 
instructions has been rejected. While not specifically stating that 
the right to trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by Article I, 
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§12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, or the right to due process and a fair trial, 
as guaranteed by Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
the position that such rights were compromised was implicit in Mr, 
Kotz1 legal analysis regarding the continued propriety of such 
instructions. 
Just as the Allen court did not outline the basis of its 
decision, the Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Thomas, 342 P.2d 
197 (Ariz. 1959), relied upon in Appellant's opening brief at 5, 9, 
did not specifically state the basis of its decision that the use of 
supplemental instructions would no longer be tolerated in Arizona. 
While the California Supreme Court briefly noted in People v. 
Gainer, 566 P.2d 997 (Ca. 1977) that the right to a fair trial and 
trial by jury guaranteed by the California Constitution were 
compromised by the use of supplemental instructions, the bulk of the 
opinion focused on the coercive nature of such instructions and the 
error in their continued use. 
The Gainer and Thomas decisions indicate that the rights to 
due process, fair trial and trial by an impartial jury are infringed 
upon by the use of supplemental instructions. The State focused on 
the issue of the continued propriety of such instructions in its 
brief, and was adequately informed, based on the Appellant's opening 
brief and its own response that the propriety of the use of 
supplemental instructions under the Utah Constitution was at issue 
in this case. 
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In addition, in Romrell v. Zion's First National Bank, 
N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court determined 
that it may, in its discretion, decide a case on "any points that 
its proper disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply 
brief" Ijd. at 395. If this court determines that the argument that 
rights to due process and trial by impartial jury guaranteed by the 
Utah Constitution were violated was not adequately advanced in the 
opening brief due to a failure to specifically cite the appropriate 
provisions, this Court may nevertheless address the issue if, in its 
discretion, it determines that the issue is important to the proper 
disposition of this case. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, 
the continued use of such instructions and the constitutionality 
thereof, is a key issue in this case. 
The State further argues that this Court is not empowered 
to adopt new rules for trial courts. Regardless of this Court's 
position on the interpretation of Article VIII §4 of the Utah 
Constitution, Mr. Kotz is not asking this Court to formulate new 
rules of procedure. Instead, Mr. Kotz is asking this Court to 
consider the existing rules of Criminal Procedure, in particular 
Utah Code Ann.§77-35-17(c) (1953 as amended) requiring all felonies 
to be tried by jury unless otherwise waived and Utah Code Ann. 
§76-35-17(1) and (m) (1953 as amended) and determine that those 
rules, read in conjunction with the Utah Constitution, require that 
this Court reject the use of supplemental instructions after the 
jury has begun deliberations. 
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CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasonsf the Appellant, 
Randall Edward Kotz, seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of 
his case to the District Court with an order for either a new trial 
or dismissal of the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1987. 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Appellant 
^-f{ii!' ::n// 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, DEBRA K. LOY, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 
day of August, 1987. 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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